Kellyn Beeck was a sales director at Epyx. Very active with the specialist press, he had long had the perfect recipe for making a game and had described it in detail. Drawing on his experience at Epyx and the games he had reviewed, Beeck’s advice to aspiring developers was a perfect checklist to avoid at least the most common reasons candidates were immediately rejected during evaluation: “Be original,” “Pick a popular computer,” “Write in assembly language,” as well as a pragmatic “Pick the right form,” which urged applicants to follow the selection procedures correctly.
In closing, Beeck emphasized: “Abracadajbra. Remember that a computer game is nothing more than an illusion. To make the illusion believable, you must convince the player that the world in your game is real. You can give your game great sound and graphics to enhance its believability, but you don't have to stop there. Give your game a personality. Make it seem intelligent. Breathe life into your game and the illusion will be complete.”
Jacob and Beeck had one very important thing in common: they were passionate about films. Jacob had decided to use movies as inspiration for making games, and Beeck—who was not entirely satisfied with his job and would have preferred to develop games—was a good candidate to handle the design of the titles Jacob had promised and needed to commission to third parties. In short, it was the opportunity of a lifetime for Beeck, and when Jacob offered him the position of director, he didn’t let it slip away.
Apart from the setting—always tied to the world of Hollywood films—and some basic ideas, Jacob had little in hand for the games he had promised. For the first one, the project he felt most optimistic about, a medieval, swashbuckling setting was chosen, and Jacob wanted to combine it with hybrid gameplay: partly directly influenced by
Risk, and partly modified to include the typical situations of the cinematic genre in question—duels, battles, and sieges. Beyond that, Jacob still wasn’t quite sure where to go, also because he was treading an entirely new path, not only given his limited experience but for the video game industry as a whole.
Jacob: “I'm a pretty creative person and I'm a good sales guy. [...] I say ‘creative’ only because I did have certain things that I wanted to do with the games I was involved with. In terms of production methodology, yes, we would have story meetings, we would flowchart the game, we would come up with storyboards. The games we were doing were different to the other games people were doing at the time. They were a lot different. So we really had to figure out where we were going with the game. We weren't doing platform games, we were doing games that had storytelling and role-playing and action and this, that and the other thing. So if we didn't know where we were going it would be a disaster, so it forced us -- I think -- to a level of oversight that was rare at the time in the industry.”
After a series of meetings, discussions, and design documents drafted by Beeck, the swashbuckling game project slowly took shape. The first draft—centered on the legendary figure of Robin Hood—was quickly set aside and replaced by a setting loosely based on Walter Scott’s historical novel
Ivanhoe, in which the clash between the Saxon populace and the Norman conquerors provided the groundwork for Risk-style strategy gameplay. Aside from the names of main characters—Saxon nobles and Norman overlords—and secondary figures—damsels in distress such as Lady Rebecca and Rowena—the common threads with the novel were few, since the new and final version of the game had far more in common with Hollywood cinema than with Scott’s story.
In his description of the “perfect” game, Beeck had advised aspiring developers to choose a good platform—“a popular computer”—but the one Jacob selected was anything but. In 1986, the Amiga was a computer people were talking about less and less, and few had purchased. The serious operating system stability issues present in Kickstart 1.0 had been partly resolved with version 1.1, released at the end of 1985, signaling to developers that the time had come to start creating software for the machine.
The Los Gatos team—where Miner’s original core had relocated—had not sat idle, pouring their energy into further improving the operating system and preparing a third updated version. They would gladly have worked on a budget version of the Amiga 1000 and were designing “Amiga Ranger,” an enhanced model, but Commodore’s management had other plans. 1985 had been a difficult year, and the Amiga launch had not yielded the expected results. New products like the C16 and Plus/4 had performed poorly, and Commodore decided to pull the plug. Even sales of the C128, while solid, fell short of expectations and—combined with sales data for the C64, which had peaked—suggested a decline and that the death of the 8-bit computer market was on the horizon.
Commodore’s new CEO, Thomas Rattigan—who succeeded Marshall Smith in February 1986—prescribed a remedy of cuts: canceling product lines, shelving prototypes, and laying off employees. The Los Gatos team was not spared by Rattigan’s new policy, as the site was among the most expensive: Amiga Ranger was canceled, staff was drastically reduced, and the office was ultimately closed, with the few remaining employees moved to Westchester. Deeply disappointed by Commodore’s decisions, Jay Miner and R.J. Mical chose to continue working on the Amiga only as outside consultants, not as employees.
The problems, however, were only beginning.
With the proper approvals and resources, the Los Gatos team believed they could deliver two new Amiga models by the second half of 1986. Ranger was canceled in favor of the Amiga 2000, developed in Westchester, while the budget version of the 1000 was assigned to Commodore’s German division. Both new models were supposed to be ready by late 1986, but repeated delays pushed the release date into the second half of the following year, and in the meantime—seeking to save money—the ill-advised decision was made to halt advertising for the Amiga 1000.
Miner: “Commodore were convinced that their 500 and German made 2000 would be ready by September ’86. So why advertise the 1000 when there wouldn’t be any around soon? So an entire year was lost while there was no advertising and no PR for the Amiga, no push to sell 1000s. But IBM and Apple used that year to good advantage. They both have colour and sound and are even close to getting multitasking. I can ‘t tell you how angry it makes me feel to see how the Amiga was handled. The advertisements they did have were absolutely awful. Old men changing into babies and kids competing in race cars. It was ghastly. And then a full year with no ads at all. They lost dealers and worst of all they lost public awareness.”
1986 was therefore a difficult year for the Amiga as well: advertising was put on hold until the long-awaited release of the two new models, and sales were sluggish—a signal that led many developers to avoid investing in a powerful machine with a small installed base that could be abandoned at any moment. Among the few developers who believed in the Amiga, however, was Trip Hawkins with Electronic Arts.
Impressed by the capabilities of Miner’s computer, Hawkins even pushed for Apple to acquire the company. On his advice, Jobs made an offer, but it was soon outbid by Commodore. At the computer’s launch, Hawkins placed a strong bet on the platform, having his Electronic Artists quickly release ports of some of their most successful games, including
One on One: Dr. J vs. Larry Bird,
The Seven Cities of Gold, and
Archon. Some of the titles he commissioned for the Amiga were even marketed before the release of Kickstart version 1.1. Aside from Electronic Arts, few game developers had faith in Commodore’s machine, and the games that did appear were, more often than not, quick ports from 8-bit platforms that failed to take advantage of the Amiga’s markedly superior capabilities.
The Amiga, on the other hand, drew more attention from utility software developers. In particular, Dan Silva programmed
Deluxe Paint specifically for the Amiga, making full use of its extraordinary graphics capabilities. The software—better known as
DPaint—was published by Electronic Arts in November 1985 and received strong praise from the specialist press.
The Amiga’s persistent problem was its installed base, which remained small—a true niche in a market still dominated by the shrinking share of users on the aging Commodore 64, a minority of Apple II users, and a growing majority on IBM PCs and compatibles. The lack of advertising, the uncompetitive price of the Amiga 1000, and the shortage of software were significant obstacles that reduced its appeal, creating a vicious cycle that was difficult to break.